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Abstract
Crisis support teams guide survivors and bereaved through the traumatic first hours and
days after disaster. Comprised largely of volunteer social workers, they focus on provid-
ing practical, pragmatic support: ‘orienting’, rather than ‘counselling’ service users. This
article examines the generally unacknowledged contextual challenges of crisis support
work in the UK. In time-compressed circumstances, making sense of ‘major incidents’
requires imaginative and reflexive assessment. First, incidents sit within a potentially
wide variety of interrelated dimensions, generating demands across geographical,
jurisdictional and organisational boundaries. Second, crisis response occurs within pro-
cesses of ‘sense-making’ that often involve controversy and social conflict. Third, intra
and inter-organisational factors may pose significant difficulties for crisis support
responders. Notwithstanding an overdue official recognition of the ‘rights’ of disaster
victims, other recent developments—within social care, private sector ‘customer care’
and in policing and security—present under-researched challenges for crisis support
teams. It is suggested in conclusion that the role and operation of crisis support teams
are overdue for review. Issues pertinent to such review are offered.
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Introduction
Response to disasters may seem removed from social work’s everyday
concerns. The profession, it may be tempting to think, has enough problems
in meeting its ‘core’ demands to devote resources to such remote contingen-
cies. Yet, when disaster does strike, social workers are usually in the van-
guard. ‘When people are made vulnerable,’ as the Social Work Task
Force (2009b, p. 5) notes, ‘what happens next matters hugely.’ This is as
true for overwhelming and unforeseen major emergency as it is for the fa-
miliar and the chronic. This article discusses the complex, contextual chal-
lenges facing UK local authority Crisis Support Teams (CSTs). UK local
authorities have lead responsibility for rehabilitating communities after dis-
aster (HM Government, 2006) with recent reform of emergency arrange-
ments centring on the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act. Drawing on Clarke’s
(2001) Marchioness Inquiry recommendations, reforms include detailed
guidance for responders. It is under these arrangements that CSTs
provide structured post-disaster support (HM Government, 2006).
Usually comprising social workers, CSTs work with the bereaved and
traumatised after mass-fatality emergencies. This article draws on disaster
literature and field research. The latter considered three major incidents
and was based upon forty-four interviews and the observation of manager-
ial and operational meetings between 2004 and 2007 (Davis, 2011).
The frequency of negative disaster-victim experiences indicates response
problems extending beyond the micro-level. Of course, specific intra/inter-
personal, team or departmental dynamics are significant (see, e.g., the
impact of management ‘types’ after Hurricane Katrina (Olejarski and
Garnett, 2010)) but they understate broader, contextual factors. Critical
analysis requires an appreciation of the potential dysfunction, disequilib-
rium, overloading and poor integration of institutionalised, complex, inter-
related systems. It also requires the understanding that the notion of system
failure as an explanatory concept has its limitations. Systems are not simply
‘functional working units, free from vested interests, social conflict or
power relations’ (Scraton, 1995, p. 4). Difficulties for victims can arise pre-
cisely as a result of systems functioning as intended or from structured con-
tradictions within or between them. Where multi-agency responses
systematically prioritise, say, public order above the interests of victims,
or where the orientation of social work has become systematically com-
modified and instrumentalised to the detriment of service users, it is mis-
leading to think in terms of ‘system failures’. Here, the smooth
functioning of such systems can undermine the human needs and rights
of victims.
CSTs, alongside other public organisations, increasingly operate in ‘con-
ditions of “permanent whitewater” that is, social, economic and political
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environments that are fraught with risk and rapid change’ (Comfort et al.,
2001, p. 144). CSTs, moreover, operate in the most difficult of circum-
stances: the immediate aftermath of disaster. Time compression generates
‘a politics of urgency . . . [in which] . . . it is the speed of being seen “to do
something” that is brought to the fore, not time for reflection and plan-
ning’ (Medd and Marvin, 2005, p. 44). Miscommunication, misunderstand-
ing and conflict are common. Following brief outlines of the emergence of
UK crisis support, the article considers three forms of disaster-related
challenge that underpin such difficulties: those arising from the scale, char-
acteristics and location of incidents themselves; those arising from the
social contexts of incidents; and those arising from organisational factors.
Together, these set the challenges and the environment within which
CSTs must act.
Humanitarian response to major incidents in the UK
Historical context
Towards the end of the Cold War, a new ‘civil protection’ discourse argued
that military and paramilitary ‘civil defence’ lacked the legitimacy, knowl-
edge and flexibility of local civilian responses (Dynes, 1994; Alexander,
2002), fitting neatly with the UK’s locally based emergency model (Hills,
1994a). These local arrangements, however, were rudimentary. After the
1966 Aberfan tragedy, the scant welfare presence was augmented by only
one additional family caseworker (Johnes, 2000, p. 6). Even twenty years
later, ‘no Health or Social Services department involved in any [of the
major UK disasters between 1985 and 1989] had a plan . . . for long-term
psychosocial response’ (Hodgkinson and Stewart, 1991, p. 67).
Things changed in the 1980s as social workers intervened after a succes-
sion of disasters (Hodgkinson and Stewart, 1991; Johnston and Beeson,
1993; Newburn, 1993). The daily response to Lockerbie involved over
one hundred social work staff (Dumfries and Galloway, 1989). After Hills-
borough, social work teams were established in nine different local author-
ities (Newburn, 1993). Nonetheless, responsibilities remained unclear and
arrangements relied on goodwill (Hills, 1994b). Moreover, evidence accu-
mulated that immediate official responses could exacerbate, rather than
mitigate, disaster’s impact. Victims were sometimes treated callously, left
uniformed or misinformed, and denied appropriate access to the deceased
and disaster sites (Coleman et al., 1990; Davis and Scraton, 1997, 1999;
Scraton, 1999; North, 2000). After the Marchioness disaster, hands were
secretly cut from twenty-five of the dead for fingerprinting (Clarke, 2001).
A public inquiry examining the aftermath of the tragedy (Clarke, 2001)
and broader review of emergency planning led, through the 2004 Civil
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Contingencies Act, to new duties, structures and guidance. Under the act,
adult and children’s services departments are still regarded as ‘best
placed to fulfil the humanitarian assistance function’ (HM Government,
2007, p. 20).
Official guidance and crisis support
People bereaved by disaster face a bewildering array of official interven-
tions and wider attention. Official processes include recovering and identi-
fying the dead, informing relatives, post-mortems, arranging viewings of the
deceased, civil and criminal investigations and ‘managing’ the media.
Throughout, guidance affirms, ‘care and support . . . is crucial in managing
the longer-term psychological effects’ (HM Government, 2007, p. 36).
Local authorities have a duty to recruit and train ‘an appropriate number
of personnel’ for emergency response (HM Government, 2005, p. 52).
Some have set up CSTs of ‘skilled, vetted, trained and prepared volunteers’
ready to respond to emergency (HM Government, 2007, p. 26). Drawn
mainly from social services, these teams assist in:
† Explaining procedures and processes, keeping people informed, and letting
them know the roles of the agencies involved
† Explaining common reactions to crisis and stress and helping identify
where specialist help is required
† ‘Signposting’ to other support and services available in the community;
helping people access these; assisting with form-filling
† Fulfilling a listening role (HM Government, 2007, p. 26).
Crisis work should ‘provide practical, pragmatic support in a sympathetic
manner, to complement the input of friends and family’ (Bisson et al.,
2007, p. 1017). Good practice is therefore:
. . .more [about] orientating than . . . treating, [it is about] mapping out for
the client the sort of difficulties that might be encountered and the direc-
tions from which means to resolve the problems might be found. The goal
of crisis counselling is to help the client get their bearings (Scott and Strad-
ling, 1992, Appendix D, emphasis added).
Responding to crisis? Disasters as complex challenges
If CSTs are to help victims ‘get their bearings’, they must first get their own.
They must make sense of what is happening. ‘Major incidents’ vary widely
across a range of dimensions. There is no single mechanical response. What
is required instead is ‘a comprehensive view of possible stakeholders and
Page 4 of 18 Howard Davis
 at Edge H
ill U
niversity College on N
ovem
ber 9, 2012
http://bjsw.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
definitions of the situation’ (Rosenthal et al., 1994, p. 125). The dimensions
along which disasters might vary include:
Chronic ↔ Acute
Visible ↔ Invisible
Effects dispersed ↔ Effects localised
Mass fatalities ↔ No fatalities
Many survivors ↔ No survivors
Many non-local survivors ↔ Local survivors only
Many seriously injured ↔ No injuries
Extensive material damage ↔ No material damage
Response capacity seriously damaged ↔ Response capacity undamaged
Natural ‘cause’ ↔ Human ‘cause’
System failure as ‘cause’ ↔ Individual error as ‘cause’
Highly newsworthy ↔ Non-newsworthy
’Blame’ a major issue ↔ ’Blame’ not an issue
Victims from marginalised groups ↔ Victims from high status groups
Victims potentially blameworthy ↔ Victims potentially ‘idealised’
Victims heterogeneous ↔ Victims homogeneous
Clearly, the scale, characteristics and location of incidents are important in
shaping the problems of the aftermath. Less obviously, incidents’ social
contexts may be significant. To declare a ‘major incident’ is easier than to
understand its complex specificities. A third set of challenges arises from or-
ganisational issues within responses themselves. Here, at inter and
intra-organisational levels, a range of factors may mitigate against appropri-
ate response.
Primary challenges: scale, characteristics and location
of major incidents
Scale is clearly important: large incidents usually require large responses.
The Lockerbie site was spread across 850 square miles and friends and rela-
tives of victims were spread around the world. Extensive disasters, more-
over, may damage response agencies themselves (Horner, 1998; Kendra
and Wachtendorf, 2003). Workers themselves may suffer trauma or loss
(Dekel and Baum, 2010). Scale, however, does not, of itself, determine
response. After one recent incident involving migrants, the Family and
Friends Centre (FFC) remained unused. The bereaved, it seemed, were
either abroad or reluctant to approach the authorities (Davis, 2011). By
contrast, the FFC for another incident involving far fewer fatalities
remained busy for several days (Davis, 2011). What was significant was
not the number of survivors, but their status as, variously, victims/sus-
pects/migrants/witnesses. So, when, after the first incident, survivors
were accommodated at the Survivors Centre, it was not because they
were homeless, but because officials did not want them to leave while
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investigations were continuing (Davis, 2011). Thus, the specific characteris-
tics of a disaster and their relationship to organisational perceptions and pri-
orities may be as significant as its scale. Some bereaved may be survivors.
Some may be injured or homeless. Body retrieval and identification may
be difficult (Hodgkinson and Stewart, 1991; Malkinson, 2003). Military or
terrorist attacks may put workers at risk of further violence. The possibil-
ities are wide-ranging.
Location is also important. Disaster sites may be confined or dispersed,
rural or urban, accessible or inaccessible. Impact may extend well beyond
the site, presenting difficulties for locally oriented services (Smith, 2003).
During the 2004 South Asian Tsunami, 30,000 Swedes were in the area
and over 500 died (Lennquist, 2004). Relatives may converge from far
afield. Disasters involving travellers or migrant communities raise linguis-
tic, cultural, legal and political issues and may evoke scant sympathy
(Rosenthal et al., 1994) whilst demanding significant engagement with
foreign agencies.
The significance of interrelationships between such dimensions was
exemplified by the 2003 French heat-wave disaster, which claimed 15,000
lives. This was not the stereotypical impact disaster of post-9/11 imaginings.
Its epicentre was ‘everywhere and nowhere’, the central target was ‘old, iso-
lated people’ and the most dangerous place was ‘at home, in bed’ (Lagadec,
2004, p. 168). Possibly as a consequence, its development was unnoticed,
then denied (Lagadec, 2004). It was a warning against conceiving disasters
in set ‘frames’—frames that may obscure rather than elucidate risk. The
challenges of disaster’s varied contingencies are not merely organisational.
They are challenges of imagination.
Secondary challenges: social contexts, sense-making and blame
Social contexts are significant for responders. For example, where extreme
events are products of violent political conflict, workers do not stand totally
apart. Professional values may be compromised and teams may fracture
(Ramon, 2004). In civilian disasters, too, contexts shape understandings
and choices. Disasters are, in short, political. The concept of ‘continuity’,
discussed below—emphasising the continuing salience of pre-disaster
arrangements and conditions at micro and macro levels through impact
and aftermath—has tended in official discourse to become associated
only with the needs of business resilience. However, at a theoretical level,
it implies the continuing (and perhaps even enhanced) significance of pre-
existing social inequalities and conflict (Green et al., 2007; Tierney, 2007;
Henry, 2011).
In this context, the ‘threat’ of disasters, for some, is that they may act as
‘focussing events’, ‘open[ing] the policy window by dramatically highlight-
ing policy failures’ (Birkland, 2004, p. 181):
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Questions are asked that previously went unformulated and the answers can
shed floods of light on what everyone previously failed to attend to and took
for granted . . .. Such civic moments can be moments of intense contestation
(Lukes, 2005, p. 1).
The stakes can be high over whose ‘truth’ prevails. Accordingly, the ‘causal
story’ is shaped by public relations specialists (Benoit, 1997; Berger, 1999;
Birkland and Nath, 2000; Tyler, 2005). This can be significant for respon-
ders in a number of ways. First, time and resources can be squandered.
After Hurricane Katrina, ‘critical time [was] wasted on . . . winning the
blame game [and] waging a public relations battle’ (Davis, 2006, p. 360).
Second, some harms may be minimised and others exaggerated amid the
politics of blame. Third, victims may be represented negatively, as respon-
sible for their own fates, for those of others or as otherwise deviant. Victims
may blame other victims and, where victims (or workers) belong to
‘suspect’ communities, workers may acquiesce in policies or practices
sharply at odds with social work values or turn on each other along nation-
al/cultural lines (Ramon, 2004). Blame indeed can pervade post-disaster
dynamics and responders may be complicit in scapegoating. After the
1989 Hillsborough disaster, police accused survivors of causing the
tragedy through lateness, drunkenness and forcing an egress gate. For
good measure, survivors were accused of pick-pocketing and urinating on
the dead (Coleman et al., 1990). Conversely, more sophisticated strategies
project a ‘caring’ image. Corporate stakeholders hire premises for
victims’ meetings, pay for travel, accommodation and counselling, and
deploy ‘specialist’ customer care teams. Deployment of an Incident Care
Team after one incident—at a cost of £23,033—was hailed by industry
peers as a public relations ‘bargain’ (ATOC Train Crash Debriefing,
18 May 2007).
CSTs will need to account for potential conflict—for example in dis-
seminating information or arranging victims’ meetings—and to manage
or integrate the activities of corporate responders (see discussion
below). Moreover, whatever the broader framing of ‘blame’, crisis
support inevitably becomes intertwined with formal investigation and
requires constructive, well-practised partnerships with investigative agen-
cies and others.
Tertiary challenges: organisational issues in effective response
A third set of challenges derives from relations within and between respond-
er organisations themselves. Organisations need adequate capacity, continu-
ity with pre-incident ways of working, but also flexibility. Between
organisations, response must be co-operative. Where these requirements
are not met, CSTs can expect problems.
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Intra-organisational factors
Capacity
Immediate response usually relies on ‘spare’ capacity. Public organisations
are, however, ‘enmeshed in an unrelenting search for cost-effectiveness’
and many ‘have done away with redundancy and back-up facilities’
(Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1996, pp. 121–2), undermining their flexibility
to ‘relax or eliminate other functions temporarily when needed’ (Corbacio-
glu and Kapucu, 2006, p. 214). Social work is severely stretched. Evidence
to the Social Work Task Force (2009b) highlighted vacancy and staff turn-
over rates significantly above those for other public sector professions. It is
a profession subject—even in non-disaster contexts—‘to widespread and
longstanding staff shortages that must compromise its ability to deliver
quality on the frontline’ (Social Work Task Force, 2009b, p. 18). Time for
service users, proper supervision and training are all compromised by
staff shortages. Problems are exacerbated by inappropriate accommoda-
tion, deficient IT and increasing administrative burdens. In this context,
CSTs are precariously positioned. One local review, for example, noted
the view that ‘setting up a team . . .was a luxury that could not be afforded
[as] staff [were already] hard pressed . . . deal[ing] with emergencies already
happening’ (Smith et al., 2003, p. 525).
Continuity
‘[T]he best predictor of [organisational] behaviour in emergencies is behav-
iour prior to the emergency’ (Dynes, 1994, p. 150). Values, knowledge,
priorities, routines and patterns of communication cannot change over-
night. Unfamiliarities with bereavement, post-mortems, police or coronial
procedure cannot be instantly rectified. Response is best built therefore
‘on everyday working practices [and] in an emergency, familiarity and sim-
plicity have virtues all of their own’ (Cabinet Office, 2007, p. 7). This raises
questions, however, around contemporary ‘everyday’ social work. Does
everyday social work prepare CSTs for disaster response? Critiques in-
creasingly suggest a profession in crisis. Caring has become commodified
and subjected to deepening, bureaucratised ‘instrumentalism’ applied
within a tightening plethora of contracts and procedures (Blaug, 1995;
Dominelli and Hoogvelt, 1996). On these accounts, social work’s primary
contemporary concern is with superintending neo-liberal regulatory prac-
tices (Carey, 2008a, 2008b; Pollack, 2010). ‘At a high emotional cost’
(Munro, 2004, p. 1087) focus is fixated on targets and social work is less
oriented towards human relationships than to information management
(Parton, 2008). For Dominelli and Hoogvelt (1996, p. 46), indeed, ‘[social
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work’s] concern with . . . therapeutic work, with . . . adaptive responses to
life situations has virtually disappeared’. Such concerns are underscored
by the Social Work Task Force (2009a, 2009b) detailing extensive,
deep-rooted problems in contemporary English social work. Over and
above the capacity issues noted above, the interim report found that super-
vision and support are often inadequate. Moreover, enmeshed within a ‘dis-
parate group of performance indicators’ (Social Work Task Force, 2009b,
p. 32), ‘social workers themselves struggle to articulate the central role
and purpose of the profession’ (Social Work Task Force, 2009b, p. 33).
The widespread view was that performance indicators measured not
quality or outputs, but the rate of completion of processes. ‘The overall
effect,’ the report noted (Social Work Task Force, 2009b, p. 32) ‘appears
to be a sense of a profession that is, in places, at risk of becoming too
mechanised and of being “de-skilled” through an emphasis on compliance
rather than judgement’.
If social work has become ‘an alienated work task’ (Ferguson and Laval-
ette, 2004, p. 304), this raises an unhappy prospect for crisis support, where
congruent, empathic relationships are at a premium. The significance of this
is ignored in official emergency discourse. Whilst the Clarke Inquiry (2001)
reported disaster social workers refusing tasks due to inexperience in
bereavement work, it failed to discuss the issue.
Flexibility
Continuity must be qualified. Bureaucracies ‘work on stable data, format-
ted problems . . .. Their basic frameworks of reference are established
rules, clear and fixed partitions of areas of competence and levels of respon-
sibility, top-down dynamics, and a programmed time frame’ (Lagadec,
2004, p. 162).
Standard procedures, however, do not account for exceptional aspects of
crisis—unpredictability, ambiguity andoverload (Dynes, 1994; Sellnow et al.,
2002).Major incidents undermine linear, centralised administration (Corba-
cioglu and Kapucu, 2006). Lagadec (2004, p. 164) observes that the response
to the 2003 French heatwave ignored signals from outside ‘convenient chan-
nels [or] in requested formats, lack[ed] a question-oriented culture’ and, tra-
gically, ‘operat[ed] with a step-by-step, centralised and top-down approach’.
After Hurricane Katrina, evacuation was slowed by bureaucratic require-
ments for air marshals and security screeners (Perrow, 2006). Emergency
rations were confiscated in case they contained explosives, volunteer
medics were turned away, as they were not licensed, and supplies were not
despatched because they could not be requested in the required fax
format. Bureaucrats clung, moreover, with resolute ‘continuity’ to stereo-
typed perceptions of black and poor people as criminals who needed
control rather than support.
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Flexibility, however, requires accurate, real-time information—a
problem for organisations with ‘orderly’, formally structured communica-
tion (Smallman and Weir, 1999). It requires open mental models, an
ability to improvise, a shared conception of the overall system, willingness
to question to interact respectfully (Weick, 1993). Groups must ‘self-
organise’ in ad hoc networks (Weiss et al., cited in Kendra and Wachten-
dorf, 2003). Comfort (2002, p. 101), indeed, identifies a narrow region on
‘the edge of chaos, where there is sufficient structure to hold and exchange
information and sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing conditions’.
In this context, junior staff must ‘carry out critical organisational tasks
without close supervision’ (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2006, p. 215).
Against procedure and protocol, they may need to take charge, without
formal authority, ‘“flattening” . . . formal hierarchy’ (Superamaniam and
Dekker, 2003, p. 314). In contrast to ‘continuity’, therefore, what is required
is ‘ambivalence to past practice’ (Weiss et al., cited in Kendra andWachten-
dorf, 2003, p. 42, emphasis added). Officials need to digest the wider
context—beyond their own organisational interests, policies and practices
including, above all, the suffering of others (Molotch, 2005). They must
also be confident that others, including superiors, will also see this ‘bigger
picture’. Overall (Molotch, 2005, p. 2), ‘unprecedented action requires . . .
a kind of panic of empathy that trumps organizational habit and individual
postures’. It is clearly a matter of concern, when flexibility is crucial, if, as
one practitioner put it in evidence to the Social Work Task Force:
The essence of a profession is when people make their own judgements and
decisions. . .We’ve taken this out of social work. We have given it a very
managerial focus. We’ve taken away some of the capacity of social
workers to think for themselves (Social Work Task Force, 2009b, p. 32).
Inter-organisational factors
Communication, co-ordination and co-operation
Major incidents ‘give[] rise to . . . incident organisation[s]; . . . temporary
configuration[s] of otherwise disparate resources drawn from many agen-
cies’ (Smith and Dowell, 2000, p. 1154). The dangers of non-co-operation
and poor co-ordination are well rehearsed in crisis literatures. But, recent
incidents suggest, difficulties have not been resolved through guidance
(Davis, 2011). ‘Co-ordination’ itself is ambiguous. It may be interpreted
as mutual agreement or as the direction of activities by one of the parties
(Hills, 1994a). The danger in the latter case is that lack of corrective feed-
back within the broader ‘incident organisation’ allows mistakes to develop
unchecked. ‘Cosiness’ can lead to a tactful avoidance of errors. ‘Polite inter-
action,’ Smithson notes (1990, p. 225), ‘trades on vagueness, ambiguity,
non-specificity, and even distortion.’ ‘An environment in which co-
operation and feedback can thrive’ (Hills, 1994b, p. 8) requires respectful
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interaction, in which information from others is taken seriously, reporting is
honest and individuals integrate their own perspectives with those of others
(Weick, 1993). Fundamentally, there is the need to avoid the wishful think-
ing involved in framing crisis as trending inevitably towards consensus,
divorced somehow from pre-disaster inequality and conflict (Tierney,
2007). Rather, ‘continuity’ implies the continuing pervasiveness of social
change, power and conflict at all levels (Henry, 2011).
Pressure towards consensus may be particularly problematic when there
is an impetus towards control. Fears over security and disorder can over-
emphasise central authority, perimeter security and information control.
Alexander (2002, p. 210) warns that ‘civil defence [can] become . . . an in-
strument of repression, subtle or otherwise in character’ and left unchecked,
security and bureaucratic priorities may lead to the subordination of
victims’ rights. In the UK, this was exemplified after the Lockerbie,
Hillsborough, Marchioness and Dunblane disasters (Coleman et al., 1990;
Davis and Scraton, 1999; North, 2000). More recently, when disaster survi-
vors were accommodated at police headquarters, some CSWs felt that
‘care’ effectively became a form of ‘detention’ (Davis, 2011). Further
afield, after Hurricane Katrina, The Army Times reported that ‘combat
operations are now underway on the streets . . .. This place is going to
look like little Somalia. . . . We’re going to go out and take the city back’
(cited in Dynes and Rodriguez, 2005, p. 2, emphasis added). Two days
later, with victims dying and with tens of thousands still awaiting rescue,
officials proclaimed the establishment of a temporary centre to charge crim-
inals (Kaufman, 2005, p. 1).
These should not be surprising outcomes where security and investiga-
tion are not counterbalanced. Police commonly assume ‘lead’ status in
‘normal’ work and guidance confirms the pre-eminence of the police in
UK emergencies: co-ordinating other agencies, securing sites, recording
evidence and processing casualty information (Civil Contingencies Secre-
tariat, 2007). Police now also have important roles in Survivor Reception
Centres, Family and Friends Reception Centres and Humanitarian Assist-
ance Centres, where they will ‘tend to be the initial point of contact’ (HM
Government, 2007, p. 24). What is needed is an enhanced appreciation of
‘interagency checks and balances’ (Rosenthal et al., 1991, p. 213), involving
the management rather than the suppression of conflict. Given the exten-
sive powers now available under the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act, CSTs
need to apply ‘traditional’ social work values to ensure the salience of
humanitarian priorities.
Psychosocial response: integration and fragmentation
Whilst there are dangers that agencies may become too close, it is notable
that responsibility for the psychosocial tasks of the aftermath has become,
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in some ways, fragmented. Hospitals may no longer have the same familiar-
ity with social work and social workers that they once had. After one emer-
gency, a manager cited a ‘nightmare’ relationship between hospital and
local authority. She rued the passing of ‘traditional’ hospital social work
teams that had ‘respond[ed] to things like road crashes . . . as part of the hos-
pital staff’ and were experienced with loss, trauma and hospital procedures
(Personal Interview, Crisis Support Manager, 2007). Now, she suggested,
CSWs enter hospitals as strangers (Davis, 2011).
Two recent developments are worth comment: the deployment of police
Family Liaison Officers (FLOs) and corporate Incident Care Teams
(ICTs). The 1999 Ladbroke Grove train crash saw the first large-scale
FLO deployment after disaster (Harrison, 2000). Their performance was
considered by Clarke (2001), whose recommendations consolidated their
emergency role. Successful crisis support now depends heavily on relation-
ships between CSWs and FLOs. However, the FLO intervention at
Ladbroke Grove was problematic:
FLOs were unsure of the role of social services, who were in turn equally
unsure of the roles and functions of the FLOs. Both groups had no knowl-
edge of ICAS, the counselling organisation nominated by the [Train Oper-
ating Companies] . . .. It was clearly not the remit of the FLOs to counsel
individuals, and both the social workers and a number of the ICAS counsel-
lors made it clear that they were not bereavement counsellors. Initially
there was no support available to those relatives dealing with bereaved chil-
dren (Harrison, 2000, p. 3).
Working relationships must be forged before incidents. In one authority,
CSWs and FLOs work in partnerships, jointly facilitating death notification,
body viewings and site visits (Davis, 2011). Such partnerships are not,
however, simply wished into existence. CSWs and FLOs train, exercise
and work together on ‘minor’ emergencies (Davis, 2011). Even where
successful, however, such partnerships raise issues of which CSWs should
be cognisant. First, roles can become confused. After Ladbroke Grove,
social workers were said to be ‘reluctant to initiate early contact with the
families as they felt their role was unclear, and to an extent superseded
by the role of the FLOs’ (Harrison, 2000, p. 4). Family liaison is, further,
primarily an investigative role (Interview with Metropolitan Police Officers,
2007). Close partnerships might actually deter victims who are apprehen-
sive about the ‘authorities’ from accessing support (Davis, 2011). Migrant
or ‘suspect’ status, for example, will be of interest to police and immigration
authorities. Police regard survivors’, relatives’ or witnesses’ disclosures to
partner agencies as potential evidence and/or intelligence and argue that
there can be ‘no absolute guarantee of confidentiality’ (Interview with
Metropolitan Police Officers, 2007). The idea of ‘covert’ use of a family
liaison ‘cover’ by anti-terrorism officers has raised debate among police
themselves (Interview with Metropolitan Police Officers, 2007).
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A second issue concerns the politics of blame. Fairly or otherwise,
some responders may be implicated in causing, failing to prevent, or
responding inadequately to incidents. FLOs in an interesting position
may be required to investigate, support victims and manage image. Po-
tential conflicts of interest here pre-date the emergence of the FLO.
After the 1989 Marchioness disaster, police pressed one mother to
keep secret her chance discovery that her daughter’s hands had been
severed in the post-mortem on the grounds that this was a ‘one-off’
mistake and that disclosing it would cause distress to others (Davis
and Scraton, 1997). In fact, the hands had been cut from twenty-five
of the dead (Clarke, 2001). More recently, the family of Ian Tomlinson,
who died after being pushed to the ground by a police officer during the
2008 G20 protests, have argued that they were ‘managed’ according to
police interests by their FLO (Lewis, 2009).
Another significant innovation, Corporate Incident Care Teams (ICTs)
often have access to significant resources (Davis, 2011). There are,
however, potential issues here around corporations’ involvement after inci-
dents in which they may have been complicit. Social workers have com-
plained, too, that FLO access to ICT resources diminished their own
roles (Harrison, 2000). This raises the possibility of public sector responders
scrambling for resources for victims, dispensed by—potentially—the
‘corporate criminal’. It is unclear, moreover, how ICTs come to an under-
standing of the local system of which they suddenly become parts. ICT
workers usually represent national or international corporations and it
remains to be seen whether they will participate fully in local planning
and preparation. Experience of local officials in one recent incident was
mixed (Davis, 2011). On the one hand, ICT funds facilitated the meeting
of practical needs. On the other, valuable CST time had to be spent orient-
ing the team, both geographically and in terms of role.
Conclusion
Crisis support operates within highly challenging contexts. Disasters
require reflexive and imaginative assessment and success depends upon a
range of organisational factors: capacity, continuity and flexibility. Yet,
resources are tight, social work, according to many is becoming de-skilled
in key areas and its bureaucratised nature is unlikely to encourage the de-
volution of authority to front line staff. Whilst ‘co-ordination’ and ‘co-
operation’ are generally exhorted, building and maintaining relationships
requires time, commitment and resources. It also requires, the continuity
principle suggests, regular interaction in ‘normal’ work (or as an alternative
in ‘minor’ emergencies). The imperatives of co-ordination and ‘partnership’
are themselves problematic, understating the risks of ‘cosiness’ and the im-
portance of corrective checks and balances. On the other hand, support can
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become fragmented. Local authorities must integrate new partners into
responses even where they have not participated in preparations. The un-
predictability of which organisations might actually be involved only
emphasises the importance of robust local arrangements.
Whilst this article outlines problems, some suggestions can be made. Na-
tionally, the cursory attention paid to crisis support in guidance should be
rectified and consider the significance of changes within social work and
between it and its partners. Local authorities should realistically appraise
the recruitment, training and practice opportunities for potential CSWs.
Fairly obvious questions suggest themselves. How can sufficient staff be
recruited, motivated and retained? How will their ‘everyday’ workloads
be managed, before or after incidents? Will their everyday work equip
them for disaster? Are they capable of, and trusted in, working outside of
familiar procedures? Perhaps most crucially, how are humanitarian prior-
ities to be most reliably secured amid multi-agency responses within
which security often dominates. Effective inter-agency response is the
most difficult challenge posed by unforeseen events. ‘Success’ requires sus-
tained investment in establishing, maintaining and renewing such relation-
ships at all levels.
A central issue throughout this article is ‘continuity’. At the organisa-
tional level, responders need to be familiar with the type of challenges
they will face, with their roles and with each other, before disaster.
One interesting option is to deploy CSTs at minor incidents. One author-
ity recently deployed teams at over thirty such incidents over three years
(Davis, 2011). Landslips, hostage situations, floods, explosions, evacua-
tions and traffic collisions were the diet on which they cut their teeth.
Continuity here was established less with the ‘everyday’ work of social
workers as with their regular CSW interventions in minor emergencies.
At a broader level, continuity does not imply ‘a neo-functionalist view
of disasters as consensus builders . . . [rather it is] . . . closely connected to
issues of social change and power played out at the micro- and macro-
social levels’ (Henry, 2011, p. 221). Harm and victimisation in disaster
and its aftermath (sometimes at the hands of official agencies) do not
stand apart from broader organisational and structural contexts (see,
e.g. Lagadec, 2004; Ramon, 2004; Tucker, 2004; Dynes and Rodriguez,
2005; Kaufman, 2005; Lukes, 2005; Davis, 2007; Scraton, 2007; Henry,
2011). Rather, it may be at just the point of disaster’s impact that
victims need skilled, knowledgeable and powerful advocates for their
needs and their rights. The key questions concern whether the pre-
disaster knowledge, practices, policies and cultures with which would-be
CSWs are presently familiar are likely to equip them for this role. The
concern must be, especially given the mounting evidence of an increas-
ingly bureaucratised UK social work in crisis, an emergency environment
increasingly dominated by imperatives of security, and the fragmentation
of psycho-social responses, that they may not.
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